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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the effect of relaxing the assumption of perfect
information in a pure exchange economy. Two concepts of equilibrium
are explored. The first, a non-cooperative concept, is that of a
Rational Expectations Equilibrium. The second, a cooperative concept,
is that of the core with differential information.
It is shown that cooperative equilibria always exist, while
non-cooperative equilibria exist almost always. The two notions of
equilibrium are then compared. It is shown that they need not
coincide, as in the case with perfect information, but that they do so
for almost all economies. Many examples are presented to illustrate the
difference between perfect information and imperfect information
equilibria.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A competitive, or Walrasian, equilibrium (as described in e.g.
Debreu [1959]) provides a description of the allocation of resources in a
non-cooperative economy in which two hypotheses are satisfied : (a)
traders are endowed with perfect information, and (b) they take market
prices as exogenously given. In recent years, there have been various.
attempts at deriving the second hypothesis, (b), from more basic
considerations, e.g. Gabszewicz and Vial, [1972], Novshek and
Sonnenschein, [1979], Hart [1979], and papers in a recent Journal of
Economic Theory Symposium [1980]. The first hypothesis, that of
perfect information is, however, usually taken as given. Almost all of
these papers derive a competitive equilibrium as the limit of imperfect,
or monopolistic, competition, as the relative size of any trader becomes
infinitesimal.
This thesis is concerned with the implications of relaxing the
hypothesis of perfect information.
Upon relaxing the first hypothesis, one has to modify the
notion of equilibrium to deal explicitly with information and
expectations. One concept of equilibrium, which retains the second
hypothesis, is that of a rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
Traders are allowed to have differential information, but a requirement
of equilibrium is that traders expectations about relevant uncertain
variables are fulfilled. This eliminates the first hypothesis, and
imposes in its stead a restriction on equilibrium.
- 5 -
The relaxation of (b) and the definition of an REE lead
immediately to a host of interesting problems. To list some, (i) Do
REE's exist ? (ii) How is information disseminated ? (iii) Can agents
use available information, together with some learning procedure, to
correct expectations and attain an REE ? (iv) How much information is
revealed at an REE ? (v) Can an REE be viewed as the outcome of a
cooperative game played between traders ? (vi) Does an REE have any-
optimality properties ?
The first four questions have been analyzed by numerous
authors, and a brief survey of the literature is presented in part 2 of
this introduction. The thesis is divided into various sections, each of
them concerned with analyzing Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) in
a model with differential and imperfect information in which prices
reveal information. The main problem analyzed is whether the standard
results on existence, optimality and core equivalence extend to such an
economy.
We shall be concerned with questions (i), (ii), (iv), (v) and
especially (vi). We ask whether a rational expectations equilibrium is a
natural notion of equilibrium in an economy with differential and
imperfect information in the sense that the properties of such an
equilibrium are similar to those of a competitive equilibrium in the case
of perfect information. The main properties examined are the following:
(a) Does an REE exist under the same assumptions as those required in
the Walrasian model ?
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(b) Is the core with differential information a well defined concept ? Do
there exist core allocations ? How much information is required to
sustain core allocations ?
(c) Does core equivalence hold ? In other words, are REE's Pareto
optimal, and can Pareto optimal allocations be decentralized as REE's ?
The following is a summary of the chapters:
(1) Introduction. The introduction summarises the results of the
thesis, and provides the motivation for the work.
(2) The model. This chapter describes the model used, and the
assumptions employed during the course of the analysis. It also
contains the statements of various mathematical results required in
defining the model. For example, it contains a detailed discussion of
the topologies used on the space of preferences, etc.
(3) Existence: In this chapter, it is proved that the equilibrium
concept concept used, that of an REE, exists for almost all economies.
The proof is demonstrated diagrammatically as well as formally. There
is a discussion of how the existence result relates to similar results
found in the literature.
(4) The Core with Differential Information. Chapter 4 examines the
notion of a cooperative equilibrium in an economy with differential
information. It is proved that the core in such an economy is well
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defined, and some properties of the core are analyzed. In particular,
we explore the relationship between this core and that in a perfect
information economy.
(5) Rational Expectations Equilibria and the Core. In this chapter, we
demonstrate the result that for almost all economies, core equivalence
obtains. This means that generically, an REE lies in the core of an-
economy with differential information, and also that core allocations can
almost always be decentralized as REE's. Core equivalence does not
obtain for all economies, unlike the case with perfect information, and
we provide examples to demonstrate some of the reasons for
non-equivalence.
(6) Trading After the Occurrence of the State. Chapter VI investigates
the problem of core equivalence in the case where all trading is
ex-post. It is shown that some of the results of the previous chapters
change significantly. In particular, it is shown that the problems of
information revelation, non-existence and suboptimality arise only in the
ex-ante case.
(7) Large Economies. In Chapter VII, we examine our results in the
case where there are a large number of agents. We show that none of
the results obtained in Chapters Ill-V are affected by the size of the
economy.
(8) Enforceability of Contracts In Chapter VIII, we ask whether the
contracts arrived at in the ex-ante trading model are enforceable in the
sense that at least one agent would sue in case of breach. It is shown
that core allocations are enforceable, but that REE's need not be. In
the light of the results of Chapter V, we show that even if an economy
reaches a sub-optimal REE ex-ante, such contracts will generally not be
observed in practice, since there is an incentive to re-negotiate all such
contracts.
The main difference between the economy we shall examine and
the Walrasian model is that prices have to serve two functions: they
have to ensure that markets clear, and also transmit information. We
then get the following scenario. Agents have some initial information,
and based on this information, they formulate their plans. This leads
to an excess demand function, which depends on the initial information
of all agents. A zero of this excess demand function, if it exists, leads
to a price vector. Agents can then use the price vector to obtain more
information than they initially possessed. This leads to a revised set of
excess demands, and correspondingly, to a new equilibrium price
vector. A fixed point of this process is called a Rational Expectations
Equilibrium. An REE is thus a price vector, p, that satisfies the
condition that based on the information contained in the price vector,
consumer demands are such that markets clear at the same price vector.
It is this element of simultaneity which leads to potential existence and
optimality problems. Our first concern is existence. An REE does not
always exist, due to a discontinuity caused by prices revealing
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information. In Chapter 1I1, we shall prove that for almost all
economies, there exists an REE. We require no additional assumptions
besides those required for existence in the traditional Arrow-Debreu
model. This is in contrast to the generic existence results obtained in
the literature. In Chapter 111, we point out why our result is a
significant generalisation of available results, and also why it cannot be
improved.
In Chapter IV, we take up the study of the core with
differential information. Contrary to previous negative results on such
cooperative equilibria, we demonstrate that the core with differential
information is a well defined concept, examine some of its properties,
and compare it to the core of an economy without any informational
problems.
As indicated, we shall examine the core of this economy, and
this leads us to consider possible cooperative outcomes in a game played
by traders with imperfect and differential information. Wilson [1976]
proposed two alternate definitions of the core for such an economy :
the 'coarse' core, in which no information is disseminated, and the 'fine'
core, in which all information is revealed. In the next section, we
define our notion of the core, which lies in between these two cases,
and discuss the various concepts. Kobayashi [1981] has recently
formalised the coarse core in accordance with Aumann's [1976]
definition of common knowledge.
The concept of the core we shall use is the following. A
coalition is called viable if, for the members of the coalition, there is
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some reallocation of initial endowments together with some system of
communication, such that this reallocation is individually rational given
post--communication information. One restriction imposed is that
post-communication information be at least as good as initial information.
The core then consists of allocations not blocked by any viable
coalition.
An REE is a non-cooperative equilibrium, and we shall compare
it to the core, a cooperative equilibrium concept. We ask whether an
REE is a natural concept of equilibrium in the sense that if agents were
allowed to cooperate, they could not produce an allocation of resources
dominating that at an REE. The motivation behind this is simple
enough. One argument used to defend the concept of an REE is that if
expectations are not rational, then there must be gains to be had by
changing the currently held set of beliefs. This argument implies that
an equilibrium in which rationality of expectations is not imposed must
produce an allocation sub-optimal relative to that at an REE. One of the
strongest justifications for analysing a competitive equilibrium is that
they lie in the core, and core allocations are Pareto optimal. It is
therefore natural to ask whether a similar justification holds for REE's,
and this is the topic of Chapter V.
In the model we shall use, uncertainty is represented by the
existence of alternate states of nature. Agents can possess differential
and imperfect information. By "information" we mean the ability to
distinguish between states of nature. This is the same as in
Radner [1968).
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The presence of imperfect information leads to constraints on
trading. In particular, it is required that if an agent is unable to
distinguish between states sI and s2' then his trades in these states
must be the same. Such informational constraints on trading were
introduced by Radner [1968]. He showed that in such an economy,
there will generally be a less than complete set of markets in operation.
We are thus in the position of examining ,the optimality of rational
expectations equilibrium in an incomplete market setting.
Hart [1975] examines the properties of equilibria when markets
are incomplete. In his model,there is an exogenously specified set of
operative markets, and he finds that some REE's may be suboptimal
relative to others. Furthermore, he shows that the opening up of new
markets can actually be welfare decreasing. The essential difference
between the work of Hart and the analysis presented below is that in
Hart [1975], the set of markets is exogenously specified, while here,
the number of markets in operation is determined endogenously by the
information held by agents. This leads to a different definition of a
rational expectations equilibrium, since prices reveal information which
can change the set of markets. An REE here is a price vector which
confirms expectations and is compatible with the implied set of operative
markets. This will become clearer below. This makes the analysis quite
different, and during the course of the analysis, we point out some of
the differences.
The analysis is divided into two parts. In Chapters lI-V, the
setting is an exchange economy where binding contracts are made prior
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to the occurrence of the state. The kinds of markets we are
considering are thus contingent claims or insurance markets. The case
in which trading takes place after a state of nature occurs leads to a
considerably different analysis, and results for this case are presented
in Chapter V.
To summarize the results for the ex-ante case, it is shown
that :
(i) An REE need not exist
(ii) However, an REE exists for almost all economies
(iii) the core is non-empty
(iv) The core of this economy can differ from that of an Arrow-Debreu
economy
(v) The core with differential information is closely related to that in an
Arrow-Debreu economy with certain informational restrictions.
(vi) Core allocations need not be fully revealing
(vii) If an allocation lies in the core, then it also lies in the coarse core
and the fine core
(viii) There may exist multiple REE's that can be Pareto ranked
(ix) An REE need not lie in the core
(x) There exist Pareto Optimal REE's that do not lie in the core.
(xi) A fully revealing REE lies in the core
(xii) For almost all economies, there exists an efficient REE
(xiii) An REE need not be fully revealing
(xiv) There exist core allocations which cannot be decentralised as
REE's.
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(xv) For almost all economies, a core allocation can be decentralised as
an REE.
The ex-post case, in which trading takes place after a state of
nature occurs, leads to a variety of modelling problems. In Chapter V,
we therefore discuss, by means of examples, the approach taken here,
which differs from the models of Radner (1979] and Shefrin [19791, who
are concerned with similar problems. The thrust of our argument is
that this case reduces essentially to that of competitive equilibrium
under certainty, and accordingly, there is no sub-optimality associated
with equilibrium. This depends crucially on how one models consumer
behavior, so we discuss some alternatives, and compare our model to
those existant in the literature. The main conclusion of this Chapter is
that the problems of information revelation, non-existence and
sub-optimality arise only in the ex-ante case, where decisions are made
prior to the occurrence of the state.
In Chapter VII, we analyze how the results obtained in the
previous chapters are affected by the size of the economy. We
demonstrate that these results are invariant to the number of
consumers. The setting for this section is a simplified version of the
model of Hildenbrand [1974], with a non-atomic measure space of
consumers. We show that all the results of the previous chapters hold
in this case. In particular, REE's need not exist, but do so
generically, the core is non-empty, and that the monopoly power due to
an informational edge does not disappear with a large number of agents.
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The final Chapter examines the issue of the enforceability of
contracts. We show that REE's may not be enforceable. In particular,
inefficient REE's will not be enforceable. It is shown that core
allocations are enforceable.
References and diagrams are collected at the end of the thesis.
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1.11 Motivation and Related Literature
There are two sets of literature which deal with the concept of
a Rational Expectations Equilibrium. The first is the macroeconomic
literature, while the second concerns the microeconomic modelling of
markets in situations of uncertainty. To motivate our analysis, we
briefly distinguish between them, and indicate how our analysis is
related to existing literature.
The hypothesis of Rational Expectations was introduced by
Muth [1961], although the concept, if not the term, seems to have
appeared earlier (see Modigliani and Grunberg [1956]). The concept
was mainly ignored until Lucas [1972] used it in a far-reaching critique
of both existing economic theory and econometric practice. The critique
was of the so-called "natural rate hypothesis", or the Phillips curve,
concerning the trade-off between inflation and unemployment (or real
output). His argument was that the conventional treatment of
expectations necessarily permitted "both short- and long-run
Phillips-like tradeoffs between inflation and real output"(Lucas [1976]).
In the words of Hall, "the benefits of inflation derive from the use of
expansionary policy to trick economic agents into behaving in socially
desirable ways even though their behavior is not in their own best
interests ...... the gap between actual and expected inflation measures
the extent of the treachery". In this context, the assumption of
Rational Expectations reduces this gap to zero, i.e. agents are assumed
to be able to correctly predict inflation, at least on average. This was
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illustrated by Lucas [1972], and somewhat more dramatically by Sargent
and Wallace [1975]. The conclusion from the analysis was that if
agents' expectations were rational in the above sense, then there is no
exploitable trade-off, even in the short run. Subsequent developments
in the macroeconomic literature have focused on the econometric
implications of such an assumption ( e.g. Barro [1977],
Sargent [1976], Sims [1972]), and on the examination of problems
whick weaken the above conclusion (e.g. Fischer [1978]).
The macroeconomic interest in expectations was followed by an
attempt to integrate the concept of Rational Expectations into general
equilibrium, microeconomic models. Previous attempts at dealing with
uncertainty (e.g. Debreu [1959], Radner [1968]) had not dealt with
the case of endogenous expectations. The introduction of the term, and
its meaning, however, were somewhat different from the macroeconomic
usage of the term. The definition of an REE focused on the relationship
between information held by agents and the market price. It only
required that this relationship, as perceived by agents, not be
contradicted by observable market variables such as the equilibrium
price. Thus, the micoeconomic definition imposes Rational Expectations
as a condition of equilibrium, not as an assumption on individual
behavior. Microeconomic models then posed questions of the form : do
there exist such equilibria, how much information is revealed at such
equilibria, etc. We remark that this is different from examining market
outcomes when agents are assumed to have Rational Expectations. The
micro usage of the term is therefore more limited than the macro usage.
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The first sets of results obtained were mainly negative.
Green [1977] and Kreps [1977] provided examples which showed that
REE's need not exist. Radner [1979] demonstrated that within a
specific model of asset trading, REE's would exist generically, and be
fully revealing. Allen [1981] extended this result to a more general
model, which is very similar to the model we shall employ. In
Chapter 1I1, we will provide an existence proof which, besides being
more simple, is much more general than any of these.
Alongside the above developments, which were in the context of
models with differential information, a theory of REE's with asymmetric
information emerged. A survey is contained in a recent paper of
Grossman [1982]. There is also a literature on learning and
convergence to an REE, a survey being contained in Bray [1980].
The literature mentioned above deals with the existence issue.
On the other hand, there has been a curious lack of study of the
optimality properties of REE's. Further, even though market equilibria
with differential information has been studied, there has been almost no
attempt to extend alternate models of economic systems in such a
setting. The only exception seems to be Wilson [1976], who examined
the core of an economy with differential information, again with mainly
negative results. In Chapter IV, we remedy this deficiency by
developing a theory of cooperative equilibria in economies with
differential information. In subsequent chapters, we examine the
optimality properties of REE's.
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II. THE MODEL
The economy is one of pure exchange, and consists of m
traders or consumers, L goods and a finite set, S={s1 , . . 's k' of
alternative states of nature. All trade is conducted prior to the
occurrence of the state of nature. The market, therefore, is one of
contingent claims. Consumers are indexed by i, i1,...,m. Each
consumer has an endowment stream, {w (s)}, where w (s) is the
endowment of consumer i in state s, w (s)>>O. In Chapter VII, we shall
examine the case of a non-atomic measure space of consumers.
A consumers information is given by a partition Ii =(EE. . n
Each E. is called an event. These events are subsets of S, E.cS, are
mutually exclusive, E.nE.=0 if iHj, and are exhaustive, u.E.=S. We
denote by Ii the initial information of consumer i, i.e. his information0
prior to his entering the market. We shall assume that the only source
of initial information is the endowment stream. This means that w (s) is
I 'measurable', i.e. s and s lie in the same event in I if and only if
w i(SI)=w (s2). The 'if' part of this assumption is not needed for the
analysis, but we impose it to emphasize that endowments are a source of
information. We will need the requirement that initial information be
compatible with initial endowments, i.e. that s ,s eE.el only if
i 1 11 2 J o
w (S1)=w (S2). This means that if endowments are different across
states s 1 and s2' then the consumer will be able to tell them apart. Our
results are not affected if consumers have more information than is
contained in endowments.
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Preferences
There are L commodities in each state of the world, and k
alternative states. The commodity space is, therefore, a subset of
Lk LkRk. Let X denote the non-negative orthant of Rk. X will be the
consumption set of all consumers.
Note: We have assumed that the consumption set is the same for all
consumers. This is purely for notational simplicity.
A preference relation on X is a reflexive and transitive binary
relation ( ), which satisfies the following additional properties:
(i) Continuity: ( y : y( )x } is closed
(ii) Monotonicity: y2x, y~x implies y(>)x.
(iii) Convexity: { y : y( )x ) is convex.
Each such preference relation defines a subset, F, of XxX,
F = { (x,y) : y( )x }
As proposed by Kannai, [1974], we can topologize the space of
preferences with the topology of closed convergence on the space of
subsets of XxX. See Hildenbrand, [1974], for a detailed description of
this topology. Briefly, preferences are said to converge if the
associated subsets, e.g. F, converge. Convergence of sets is defined
as follows:
For a sequence of subsets F n' let
liminf A ={z : there exists z +z, with z EA , all n}n n n n
limsup An ={z : there exists z nEA , all n, and a further subsequence,
z +z
n
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limsup An is then the set of all subsequential limits of sequences
contained in An' while liminf An is the set of limits of all convergent
sequences in A Then,
An -+A in the closed convergence topology if and only if
liminf An = A = limsup An. Note that liminf An climsup An' so to
prove that An -A, it suffices to prove that limsup A cAcliminf A This
n n n
definition of convergence has some intuitive content, to which we now
turn.
Consider the indifference curves shown in Figure 1, ( )n and
( ). The topology is defined in terms of the preferred-or-indifference
sets, like the shaded area. Then, the preferences depicted by (2)n
converge to those depicted by (2) if the following tWo conditions are
satisfied: (a) if yn ( )n x, all n, and yn-*y, then y(2)x, and (b) if
y(2)x, then there exists y n +y such that y n( )n x, all n. The
interpretation, then, is that all the preferred-or-indifferent sets
converge.
Let P denote the space of all preference orderings with the topology of
closed convergence. The aggregate space of preference relations is the
m-fold product of P, denoted by Pm. P is endowed with the topology of
closed convergence, (see Hildenbrand [1974, p.18]). Pm is given the
product topology. We shall denote by Pm the subset of P which
s
consists of strictly convex preferences.
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Theorem 1: With the topology of closed convergence, Pm becomes a
separable, metrizable space.
Proof: See Hildenbrand [1974]
All the examples that we shall give will assume that consumers are
expected utility maximizers. Further, since most other work in this
area assumes that consumers are expected utility maximizers, we
establish a notation for this case. We shall denote by p (s) the
subjective probability of state s occurring, as held by consumer i. In
this case, we shall write the expected utility function as
V (x) = Z p (s)U (x(s)).
We remark that the hypothesis of expected utility maximization is not
needed for any of the results established.
LkPrices are elements of Rk. We denote by A" the set of all
strictly positive prices. These prices will generally impart some
information to consumers. Therefore, we denote by Ii the final
information of trader i. We shall further assume that prices are the
only source of information to consumers besides initial endowments. A
formalisation is provided below, after the following technicalities.
For two partitions I and J, we say that I is finer than J written
IcJ, if for AEl, BEJ, either AcB or AnB=0 In this case, J is said to be
coarser than J, and I is also said to refine J. The meet of I and J,
written as IVJ, is defined as the coarsest partition that refines both I
and J. For example, if I = {(a,b),(c,d)) and J = {(a,c),(b,d)}, then
IVJ = {(a),(b),(c),(d)}. IVJ can thus be thought of as the best
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information obtained from pooling the information in I and J. The
notation VI , all i, will denote the meet of all the i , as i ranges over all
the agents.
Definition 1: Given prices p and initial information I, i1,....,m, I
is a final information if
(i) I'cl' ,all i.
.o .
(ii) VISI'I, all i.
(iii) s.i, s2 eE El if and only if slIs9 eEkel and p(s )=p(s 2 ).
(i) states that final information can be no worse than initial
information, (ii) states that final information cannot be finer than
(better than) that available in the economy as a whole, while (iii)
ensures that prices and endowments are the only sources of
information. An alternate, but equivalent, way to define final
information is the following. Let K(p) be the partition of S generated
by p, i.e. s1 ,s 2 EEEK(p) if and only if p(s 1 )=p(s 2 ). Then,
I =1 VK(p). We maintain the form of the definition for ease of0
comparison with final information in the cooperative economy, in which
case there are no prices.
Faced with prices p and final information I , a consumers
budget set is given by
(p'wI')={xEX: E p(s). x(s) E p(s).w i(s)
and x(s 1 )=x(s 2 ) if s1 ,s 2 eE el }.
Lack of information thus imposes a constraint on trades open to
the consumer. In particular, if he cannot distinguish between two
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states of the world, then his trades conditional on those two states must
be the same. In other words, if a traders final information does not
allow him to distinguish between states s I and s2' then he cannot
promise to deliver different commodity bundles in the two states. He is
only allowed to make trades which he can actually verify. Without such
an assumption, a severe moral hazard problem can arise, with
corresponding implications for the enforceability of such contracts.
Such informational constraints on trading were introduced by
Radner, [19G8], and a more detailed discussion of these constraints can
be found there.
We have incorporated the informational constraints directly into
the budget set rather than as a separate set of constraints. Therefore,
the budget set actually represents the set of feasible consumption
bundles for the representative consumer, both in the sense of
affordability and in the sense of informational feasibility.
Since the informational constraints apply to all consumers, we
assume that aggregate initial information is perfect, i.e. that
VI i=[{s },.....,{sk}] We do this because if two states cannot be
initially distinguished by anybody, then we can effectively view them as
a single state. This assumption also rules out a conceptual problem that
can arise in this model if there are multiple equilibria, which is that the
equilibrium price may reveal more information than is available in the
economy as a whole ( see Kreps, [1974]).
A consumers problem is to choose a ( ).-maximal element of
S(p,w' I, ). The possibility of non-existence arises because 0 is not
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upper-hemi continuous in p. Next, we define a rational expectations
equilibrium.
Definition 2: A Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is a price
vector p, a set of final informations (I }, and a set of allocations
{x (s)), such that
(i) (x (s)) is a (2) -maximal element of j3(p,w ,l )
(ii) I x (s) s I w'(s), all s.
The fact that we require Ii to be a final information, together with
condition (i), implies that the information on which demands are based
is the same as the resulting final information, which means that
expectations are fulfilled.
Such an equilibrium can be thought of as a fixed point of the following
iterative process. Agents start with information I , observe some
initial prices p9, and formulate their excess demands. These are
transmitted to the market, and an equilibrium price, say pl, is
established. At this point, agents have more information, since they
can use pi to update 1 . In particular, if p(s I) p(s2 ' then they
can distinguish between s1 and s Let I denote their information
having observed p1 , II cl . This leads to a new set of excess
demands, and consequently a new set of prices, say p2 . new
information I cl , and so on. Note that it is not necessary that I2 be
finer than I . At a fixed point of this process, the information
- 25 -
revealed by prices is the same as that which led to these prices, i.e. is
an REE. We note that the definition does not imply that differential
information cannot prevail at an REE. For example, if
II = [{a,b},{c,d}] and 12 = [{a,b,c,d}], then p(a)=p(b)=p(c)=p(d)
satisfies (iii), but agent 1 has strictly more information than agent 2.
Next, we demonstrate that an REE need not be fully revealing.
Example 1 : (A non-revealing REE)
The initial data are
state
a b c
1 5 3 3
agent 2 3 5 3
3 4 4 6
I =[{a),{b,c}]
12{=[a,c},{b}]
13 =[{a,b},{c}]
pt (s)=1/3, all i,s; U (x)=log(x), all i.
Then, p(a)=p(b)=p(c)=1 is a non-revealing REE for this economy, as is
easily checked by computing informationally constrained excess demands
and computing equilibrium prices.
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Ill. EXISTENCE
In general, an REE need not exist, due to an informational
discontinuity (see Radner [1979]. The model used by Radner is an
ex-post model, however, and in the following example, it is shown that
this problem arises in the ex-ante case. In Chapter V, we will show
that if the ex-post case is modelled differently from Radner [1979],
there is no existence problem.
Example 2 : (Non-existence of an REE)
Consider an economy with two agents, three states and one commodity.
Initial information and endowments are given below.
state
a b
agent 1 2 2
2 1 3
I =[{a,b)]
12 =[a},{b}]
UI(x) =U2 (x) = log(x); the subjective probabilities of the agents are
(a,1-a), (M,-0).
Suppose there is a fully revealing equilibrium, i.e. one with
p(a) $ p(b)=1. Then, agent 2 can distinguish between states a and b,
and the constraint x2 (a) = x2 (b) imposed by initial information no
longer holds.
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Let Y and Y2 denote the incomes of the two agents. Then, market
clearing for the good in state a requires
aYI/p(a) + 5Y2/p(a) = 3,
while that for the good in state b requires
(1-a)Y1+(1-5)Y2= 5.
It is easy to see that for any choice of a and 5 such that a+l=3/4, the
only equilibrium is p(a)=1, which means that agent 1 cannot distinguish
between states a and b, and the informational constraint once again
becomes binding. We conclude that there is no fully revealing
equilibrium for this economy.
Suppose, then, that we look for an equilibrium with p(a)=p(b)=1.
Agent 2 is still unconstrained, and his demands thus stay the same;
agent 1, however, is restricted to consume the same amount in both a
and b. The resulting excess demand functions are
(1/2)Y+SY 2 = 3 and
(1/2)Y 1 + (1-S)Y 2 = 5.
For P#1/4, there is no solution. Thus, there is no equilibrium with
p(a)=p(b). We conclude that there in no REE for this economy for
appropriate a and S.
It is instructive to examine the source of non-existence in more
detail. The usual method of proving the existence of equilibrium
employs a fixed point theorem. For example, Brouwer's fixed-point
theorem states that any continuous function from a compact, convex and
non-empty subset of Rn to itself has a fixed point. The relevant
functions that arises in this type of model can fail to be continuous
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(upper- hemicontinuous in the case of correspondences), and this
happens because a small change in prices can lead to a drastic change
in an agents' feasible set. Figure 2 illustrates. Suppose e(a)=e(b).
Then, if p(a) $ p(b), the feasible set is the area ODE. If p(a)=p(b),
the feasible area 'shrinks' suddenly to the line OA. Thus, a small
change in prices can lead to a discontinuous change in the feasible set.
The budget correspondence thus fails to be upper-hemicontinuous, and
demand functions therefore need not be continuous. In general,
therefore, an equilibrium need not exist. Figure 3 depicts an economy
for which there is no REE.
It is interesting to compare the non-existence of equilibrium
here with that in Hart [1975], who uses a different model. Hart's
example of non-existence demonstrates that for certain market
structures, an equilibrium may fail to exist. Non-existence is a
possibility even if all agents have identical information. However, the
imposition of a uniform upper bound on trades rules out non-existence.
Differential information, and the revelation of information, however, can
change the set of operative markets, leading to non-existence, as shown
by the example. Here, it is seen that if we endogenise the market
structure, there may be no set of markets which give rise to an
equilibrium. The imposition of an upper bound on net trades can
always yield the existence of a no-trade equilibrium (e.g. by setting
the bound on net trades to be zero), and we do not discuss this
further.
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The first question one might ask is whether a small
perturbation in initial endowments can restore equilibrium in the
example. The answer is clearly yes, since we can always perturb
endowments so as to give agent 1 perfect information. In this case,
there is no informational problem, and the economy reduces to an
Arrow-Debreu economy, and there exists an equilibrium.
Such perturbations of endowments change initial information.
The question of interest is whether there exist changes in endowments
compatible with a given set of initial information which restores
equilibrium in the model. This leads to two possible modelling
strategies. The first is to define the space of endowments of each
agent so that endowments are compatible with the given set of initial
information. The second, easier, way is to consider perturbations in
income. Income perturbations get 'added-on' to the end of the budget
constraint, and do not interfere with initial information. We shall follow
the second strategy. Thus, we shall examine whether small changes in
an agents income restores equilibrium in the model. It is clear that for
given prices, we can always convert income into an informationally
compatible endowment. Such perturbations in income (endowments) will
be combined with perturbations in preferences.
It is seen from Figure 3 that there is a small change in
preferences such that the full information equilibrium is not at a
non-revealing price. In this case, point E is an REE, and a small
change in preferences restores equilibrium to the example. This
example demonstrates the following simple fact. Suppose we let
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consumers choose consumption plans without imposing any informational
constraints. This economy will have an equilibrium under our
assumptions, as is well known. Furthermore, if this equilibrium is at a
fully revealing price, i.e. p(s)#p(s2 . if Sss then it is also be an
REE with final informations equal to VI . Thus, if we can prove that
most unconstrained economies have fully revealing equilibria, then we
have proved that most economies have an REE.
This is not a new approach. Previous analyses of this problem
have followed the same reasoning, e.g. Radner [1979] and Allen, [1981]
Both these authors assume that agents are expected utility maximizers,
and Radner proves generic existence by perturbing subjective
probabilities. Allen uses log-linear perturbations of expected utility
functions. We too shall prove generic existence by perturbing
preferences. The proof, however, is different from that employed by
either of these authors, and the result proved is stronger. Some
differences are :
(i) We do not impose any restrictions on the relative dimensionalities of
the set of states and the set of commodities.
(ii) We do not require preferences to be differentiable or strictly
convex.
(iii) We do not require the existence of selections from the Walrasian
correspondence.
(iv) The proof is very simple, as will be shown below.
Prior to a formal presentation of the proof, we describe the
technique we shall use, and compare it to those used in the literature.
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Consider a full information economy, i.e. an economy in which
there are no informational constraints. Such an economy is a standard
Walrasian economy, and under the assumptions we have made, there
exists an equilibrium for this economy. Let W(( ),w) denote the
Walrasian correspondence. It is well known that W is closed and
non-empty valued, and also that it is upper hemi-continuous. Next, let
us examine the price space. In R 2, it is easy to see that almost all
prices are fully revealing, as in Figure 4. Thus, any non-revealing
price vector can be derived as the limit of a sequence of fully revealing
price vectors. Further, the set of all fully revealing prices is open.
An immediate consequence of the upper hemi-continuity of W is that the
set of preferences for which there exists a fully revealing full
information equilibrium is open. It remains to establish density, and
this has been the focus of, e.g Allen, [1981] and Radner, [1979].
These authors have focused on the invertibility of the 'price
function'. Their analysis proceeds as follows. Suppose there is one
commodity and k securities. Let y denote information which is available
in the economy as a whole, and w.(y)=Prob(s=s.y). Let P(Tr) denote
the equilibrium price vector given r Then, if P is invertible, knowing P
is equivalent to knowing a, i.e. s. Allen shows that P(n) is generically
invertible. The proof, however, requires strong regularity
assumptions. In particular, it requires that P be a smooth function.
This means that there must exist a (globally) smooth selection from the
equilibrium correspondence. The literature on the local uniqueness of
equilibrium demonstrates that all one can hope for is a locally smooth
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selection. It is unclear what restrictions the selection assumption
imposes on preferences and endowments. We shall not require any such
assumption.
Next, we provide a diagrammatic exposition of the proof. We
know that if the full information equilibrium is fully revealing, then it is
an REE. Suppose there does not exist an REE. The full information
equilibrium must, therefore, be non-revealing. Consider the
representative consumer, depicted in Figure 5. x(p) is his full
information demand at prices p, and p is a non-revealing price. We
know that there exists another price vector, q, arbitrarily close to p,
such that q is fully revealing. Further, we know that markets clear at
x(p). Suppose, then, that we give the consumer an income
perturbation, k, such that x(p) is just feasible at prices q. This leads
to a new budget set, denoted by the dotted line. Finally, we perturb
his indifference curve, U, to the dashed indifference curve, Uq, such
that x(p) is actually chosen at prices q. Then, q is a full information,
fully revealing equilibrium for the perturbed economy. As q gets closer
to p, k becomes smaller, and U" gets closer to U. A formalisation of
this simple idea is provided below.
We start with some definitions and elementary results.
Definition 3: A full information equilibrium is a price vector p and
allocations (x (s)) such that :
(i) x (s) is (>)i-maximal on (x : E p(s).x(s) X p(s).w (s)}
(ii) Ex (s) 5 E w (s), all s.
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Definition 4: A price vector is called fully revealing if sa Is2 implies
p(s2 
m)pp(s2)
Lemma 1: If there exists a fully revealing full information equilibrium,
then there exists an REE.
i iiProof: In this case, let I =VI . Since p is fully revealing, I is a final
information. Then,
5(p,w ,l )=(x:p.x p.w ). The full information allocation is therefore
feasible, and markets clear. Further, it satisfies condition (ii) of the
definition of an REE.
Lemma 2: If the full information equilibrium occurs at autarky, then
there exists an REE.
Proof: Let p be the full-information equilibrium price such that each
agent chooses to consume his endowment. To each agent, assign final
information as follows. Let K be the partition of S generated by p, i.e.
s ,s 2 EEEK if and only if p(s )=p(s 2 ). Let I =1 VK. It is easily
checked that I is a final information. The initial endowment satisfies all
measurability requirements, and is feasible at prices p. Thus, p is also
an REE.
It follows that for there to not exist an REE, the full information
equilibrium must involve trade and must be at a non-revealing point.
In what follows, endowments will be held fixed at w (s). We shall
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denote by k the income perturbation of consumer i, and the full
information budget set will then be denoted by
S(p, k i)={ x p.xsp.wI+ki}
Let $: Pm+Ao xY be the full information equilibrium correspondence. To
each element of Pm and to each income perturbation keY, it associates a
set of full information equilibrium prices. As is well known, $ is
non-empty valued under the assumptions we have made.
Definition 5: A correspondence F:X+Y is said to be upper-hemi
continuous (uhc) at x if F(x)$, and if for every neighbourhood V of
F(x), there exists a neighbourhood U of x such that F(z)cV for all
zeU. If F is uhc at all x in X, then it is simply called upper-hemi
continuous, abbreviated to uhc.
Definition 6: A correspondence F:XY is call lower-hemi continuous
(lhc) at x if F(x)$O, and x n-x, ysF(x) implies there exists a sequence
Yn' n+y with y n Y.
If a correspondence is both uhc and lhc, then it is said to be
continuous.
Lemma 3: e is uhc.
Proof: See Hildenbrand [1970], or Hildenbrand and Mertens [1972].
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Lemma 4: {psA": p is fully revealing) contains an open and dense
subset.
Proof: Let p be a fully revealing price. Thus, p(s )#p(s.) for i/j. Let
S=min {lpj(sl)-pi(s21 j (s )/pP(s2)} where s,1s2' and i,j=1,. . . ,m.
Then, 6>0. Pick 0<E<6 Then, any p' in the E-neighborhood of p is fully
revealing. This establishes openness.
To prove density, let p be a non-revealing price. Thus, p(s )=p(s 2)
for some s I s2 . Choose k numbers, , . .. E: E: , and define pn (S)
by:
If p(s )/p(s'), all s'cS, p n(s )=p(s)
If p(s 1 )=p(s 2 ) for some S2' n (s )=p(s )+(1/n)ss'
The E. can be chosen such that p (s1 )$p (S2 ) all s 1S2'
Then, p n(s)-+p(s), all s, and pn (s) is fully revealing for all n.
Theorem 2: The subset of Pm for which there exists a fully revealing
full information equilibrium is open.
Proof: is uhc. From Lemma 4, there is an open subset of A*, say A,
such that every price in A is fully revealing. Then, Definition 5
implies that the set of preferences in Pm for which there exists a fully
revealing equilibrium is open.
Let :A*-+Pm xY be the inverse map induced by $, but restricted to the
set of strictly convex preferences. To each price p, tp associates the
set of preferences and income perturbations for which, given
endowments w, p arises as the full-information equilibrium. The rest of
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the proof consists of establishing that +P is lower hemi-continuous, which
allows us to prove density. Then, the uhc property of $ establishes
openness.
Lemma 5: p is non-empty valued.
Proof: Choose the income perturbation of each agent to be zero. Let
pcA" be given. For each i, this defines a budget set, S(p,w i). We
shall construct preferences for each individual consumer, and we thus
ignore the superscript i.
Let ( ) be any preference relation in Ps' and at prices p, let x(p) be
the (unique) choice of consumption. Define a new preference
relation, (>)', as follows :
y(2)'z <==> y-(w-x(p)) (W) z-(w-x(p)). It is easily seen that (>)' is
reflexive and transitive, and is also closed. We show that it is strictly
convex and monotonic.
(i) ( )' is strictly convex
Let y, ( )' z, y2  (-)' z.
Then, y,-(w-x(p)) (W) z-(w-x(p)), and y 2 -(w-x(p)) ( ) z-(w-x(p)).
Since ( ) is strictly convex, we have that for O<X<1,
Xy 1 +(1-X)y 2 -(w-x(p)) (>) z-(w-x(p)), and so Xy +(1-X)y2 >)' z.
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(ii) ()' is monotonic : Let y ( )' z, and y'cX, with y' y. Then, we
have that y'-(w-x(p)) ( ) y-(w-x(p)) ( )' z-(w-x(p)), and so
y' (W)' z.
Thus, ( )'sP . Next, we show that at prices p, the (2)'-maximal
element of the budget set is w, the endowment point. This is seen as
follows.
Suppose not. Then, there exists y'Es(p,w) such that y' (>)' w, i.e.
y'-w+x(p) (>) x(p), which contradicts the fact that x(p) was chosen at
prices p and preferences (2), since y'-w+x(p) is feasible at prices p.
Since each consumer chooses not to trade at prices p, given
preferences (2)', p is an equilibrium price for the set of preferences
Theorem 3: Let (2)EPm , and suppose that there is no REE for ( ).
Then, there exists a sequence of preferences, ()n '( ), and a
sequence of income perturbations, k *0, such that ( ) has a fully
n n
revealing full information equilibrium when consumers are given income
perturbations k .
Proof: Our construction will be for an arbitrary consumer, and we
therefore omit the superscript i. Let p be the full information
equilibrium price. From Lemma's 1 and 2, we know that p is a
non-revealing price, and also that there is trade at prices p. From
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Lemma 4, we know that there exists a sequence, p n+p such that each
pn is fully revealing. We shall construct a set of income perturbations,
k n and preferences, ( )n such that pn is the full information
equilibrium for ()n , with (2) (), and kn -*0.
w(s) is the endowment stream for the representative consumer, and at
prices p, his income is p.w=Yp(s).w(s). Let
kn = p n'x(p)-p w, where x(p) is the unique' consumption
bundle of the agent at prices p. We know that markets clear at prices
p, i.e. that Ex = 0. Then, x(p) is feasible at prices pn' with
additional income k since
pn .x(p) = pn .w + k n
Note that p>>O, since preferences are monotonic, and therefore we can
choose all the pn to be strictly positive.
Define a new set of preferences, (2)n by:
x ( )n y if and only if
x (p)+ [ (pn/p3(X ~"(P3 ) (2 "(P)+[E Pn/p3 (Y~" (P3 3 ]
where p nx/p is the vector whose j'th element is p x /pl, i.e. the
onyn
multiplication and division is done element by element. Note that this
1 x(p) is unique since ( ) is strictly convex.
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construction of preferences depends on the initial preferences relation,
( ), and on the prices p and pn'
It is straightforward to verify that ( )n is a preference relation on X,
given ( ), p and pn'
We claim that at prices pn' x(p) will be chosen by the representative
consumer. This is seen as follows. Suppose not. x(p) is feasible at
prices p n' so there must exist a feasible consumption vector, say y,
such that y (>) n x(p). By construction of ( ) n' this means that
x(p)+[(pn/p)(y-x(p))](>)x(p). But x(p)+[(pn/p)(y-x(p))] is feasible
at prices p, since p n'ypn. w+kn Pn. x(p). This means that either
x(p)=y, or that x(p) is not the optimal choice of consumption at prices
p, a contradiction.
We already know that markets clear at x, and x(p) is thus a full
information equilibrium at prices p n. We need only to verify that kn+0,
and that ( ) n(>).
Since pn +p' and kn=Pn*x(p)P-pw=pn' x(p)Px(p), we get that k -*0.
To demonstrate convergence of preferences, we shall denote by F the
graph of ( ), and by F that of ( ) . We have to show that F -+F in
n n n
the topology of closed convergence.
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Thus, let (x,y)EX. To show that liminf F n=F, let
x n x(p)+ n p )(x-x(p))], and yn np)+[(p/p) (y-x (p))]. Then,
pn p implies that x +x and y ny.
To show that limsup Fn=F, let (x ny)EFn' all n, with x x, yn-*y.
Then, there exist (x',y')eF such that x'=x(p)+[(p n/p)(x-x(p))]
and y'=x(p)+[(p /p)(y-x(p))]. Since F is closed, we have that
(x,y)eF, since x'+x, y'+y.
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 4: For an open and dense subset of P mxY, there exists an
REE.
Proof: Openness was established in Theorem 2. Density is a
consequence of Theorem 4, since any convex preference relation is the
limit of a sequence of strictly convex preference relations. This last
part is proved by Kannai, [1974].
At this point, two remarks are in order. First, Theorem 3
establishes a property of the Walrasian correspondence, $, which may
be of independent interest. This is that the inverse map induced by $
is lower hemi-continuous ( in fact, this inverse mapping is a continuous
correspondence). Note that this does not imply that $ is continuous.
An implication of this result is that small changes in relative prices can
be obtained by small perturbations in preferences/incomes. This should
be interpreted with care. It does not mean that small changes in
preferences/incomes will lead to small changes in equilibrium prices, but
- 41 -
only that there exists some perturbation of preferences/incomes leading
to a small change in in prices.
The second remark concerns the existence of REE's when the
set of potential markets is incomplete. In the model considered, we
have k alternative states of nature, and accordingly, k potential
markets for contingent commodities. The existant literature on the
existence of REE's is sometimes concerned with the problem when there
are less than k potential securities markets. Suppose that, for some
reason, only n<k such markets are allowed to operate. Then, p cannot
reveal all the states in S. However, it is straightforward to verify that
if there exists a full information equilibrium with the n<k markets, then
there generically exists an REE which fully reveals the n states in
which trading is permitted. For this reason, the existence result
established does not require the imposition of any restrictions on the
number of operative markets.
The final part of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the
importance of the assumption that there are only a finite number of
states. We shall argue that this assumption is crucial in the proof of
generic existence because of a simple property of the price space.
Green [1977] and Radner and Jordan [1977] have provided examples to
show that with an infinite number of alternative states of the world,
REE's do not exist generically. However, their analysis does not make
clear the reason for this result.
Suppose, then, that there are an infinite number of alternative
states of the world. To fix ideas, let S=[0,1]. The discussion will
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focus on the space of prices. Recall (Lemma 4) that the proof of
Theorem 3 was based on the fact that "most" price vectors were fully
revealing, and we could therefore approximate a non-revealing price by
a fully revealing price.
With S=[0,1], the price space becomes infinite dimensional. In
each state of the world, there are L goods. This means that prices are
functions, p:S*R, , with p(s) eR being the price vector if s. The
price space, therefore, is the space of all functions from S to R+. Let
us denote this space by A(S,R+).
With a finite number of states, A" was given the Euclidean
topology. With a continuum of states, we have a choice of imposing a
uniform topology. However, the point we wish to make is most clearly
illustrated with the product topology or the topology of pointwise
convergence. This topology is defined as follows.
Given a point sES and an open set U in S, let
LB(s,U)=( p : pEA(S,R,) and p(s)cU)
The sets B(s,U) form a sub-basis for the product topology on
LtA(S, R). This means that the general basis element for this topology
Lis a finite intersection of sets of the form B(s,U). For pEA(S,R,),
therefore, a neighborhood consists of functions q which are "close" to p
at finitely many points. Thus, q can be arbitrarily close to p, and still
be non-revealing. This immediately implies that the set of all fully
Lrevealing prices in A(S,R,) cannot be open ; furthermore, it cannot
contain an open set all of whose elements are fully revealing. This, in
turn, implies that "most" price functions are not fully revealing, and
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that there is no direct proof that the space of economies with fully
revealing equilibria is open. Green's example shows that, in fact, there
is an open set of economies for which there is no REE.
The statement that accompanies examples of non-existence with
a large number of states usually says that this is because the price
space is "in some sense" too sparse to fully reveal information. The
above discussion makes this notion precise.
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IV. THE CORE WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION
In examining possible cooperative outcomes when traders have
differential information, one has to allow for the possibility of
information transfer. To start with, we can examine two polar cases :
that with no information transfer, and that with all information being
transferred. Wilson [1976] examined these cases, which go by the
names of 'coarse core' and 'fine core' respectively. We shall examine
these cases, and also a more general notion of the core.
The first and foremost problem we have to face is that of
modelling the transfer of information across agents. In the
non-cooperative market economy, prices served this purpose. There is
no such obvious mechanism in the cooperative game. Further,
established economic theory does not provide an adequate framework for
modelling communication across agents in this setup. There have been
two types of attempts at modelling a process of communication within an
economy, and we discuss them briefly.
The first literature deals with the informational efficiency of the
competitive mechanism, e.g. Mount and Reiter, [19741, Walker, [1977]
and in a context more similar to ours, Jordan, [1976]. This literature
demonstrates that the competitive mechanism is uniquely informationally
efficient within the class of allocation mechanisms considered. These
papers do not deal with cooperative games or with differential
information, and it is unclear whether the methodology developed
therein can be extended to accomodate such games.
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The second literature examines information transfer in a
principal-agent problem, e.g. Green and Stokey, [1980]. The principal
receives information, and transmits it to the agent. The situation is
one of conflict, not cooperation. Related work includes that of
Marschak and Miyasawa, [1968].
We shall follow a different strategy. In the cooperative game,
we shall assume that communication takes place within coalitions.
However, we shall abstract away completely from method of
communication, i.e. we will not impose any restrictions whatsoever on
the process of information transfer. Thus, agents will be allowed to
communicate by word of mouth, via quantity signals, etc. The rationale
for following such a strategy is two-fold.
The first is the analogy with the traditional model of the core.
In such models, it not necessary to know how coalitions form, or how
agents within coalitions communicate to block allocations. It is possible
to make definitive statements about the core without needing to know
the process of coalition formation. A second such analogy is provided
by our model of rational expectations equilibrium. There too it is
possible to obtain results about REE's without needing to know how
market prices are formed or how they get to contain information. The
point is that it is possible to analyse the outcome of a game without
having to model the process which leads to the outcome.
The second rationale comes from the results. We will show that
the core in our case is very similar to that in the standard
Arrow-Debreu economy.
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The strategy, then, is to impose restrictions on final
information and final allocations without specifying how they are
attained. We will amend the traditional notion of the core by defining
the core with differential information to be the set of
allocation-information pairs which are not blocked by any coalition. A
formal treatment follows.
Contracts are assumed to be binding, and we therefore require
that the allocations of members of the coalition are compatible with
information attained within the coalition. Thus, if ei(s 1 ) = ei(s 2 ) but
0 (S 1 0' (s 2 ' where a' is the allocation to agent i in the coalition,
then the agent can distinguish between s and s2. Whether such
contracts are enforceable is discussed in Chapter VII.
As before, lack of information poses a constraint on allowable
trades. If a consumer is unable to distinguish between s1 and s2' then
his trades conditional on s must be the same as those conditional on s2'
In this Chapter, we will not assume that aggregate initial information is
perfect. When necessary, this assumption will be stated as a
hypothesis of a result.
Definition 7 : A coalition consists of a set of agents Cc{1,...,m}, a set
of allocations (a i(s)), i C C, s E S, and a set of final
informations (J ), i E C, satisfying
(i)J cl' , J'VI', all i E C
o o
(ii) (s1 ,s2 ) EA EJ implies a (s ) O (s2 ), all i
(iii)ai (s) s e i(s), all s
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(iv) 0 ( ). e
(ii) is the 'measurability' constraint : if two states are not
distinguishable, then the allocations in these states must be the same.
Note the the converse need not hold.
(iii) requires that allocations be feasible within the coalition, while (iv)
requires core allocations to be individually rational.
(i) requires that final information be no worse than initial information,
and also that final information cannot be better than that obtained by
pooling all the information available within the coalition. This is the
only restriction imposed on information, and is in keeping with the
usual definition of a coalition, which requires a coalition to be
self-sufficient. An alternative condition would be to require that final
information be no better that that available in the economy as a whole:
(i)' J , J' ,VI i=1,....,m.
This would allow coalition C to observe the actions of agents outside C,
or to communicate with them, and infer more information than is
available within C.
Our theorems on the existence of core allocations and the
optimality of REE's are not affected if we replace (i) by (i)'. However,
the size of the core is affected by this condition. We shall show that
the core with (i) is generally larger than that with (i)', as one would
expect.
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Whether we choose to impose (i) or (i)' depends on our
interpretation of the core. In particular, it brings up the question of
the enforceability of contracts in a setting of differential and imperfect
information. In the standard formulation, i.e. in an economy with
perfect information, a coalition is required to be self-sufficient. It can
only block, or improve upon, allocations based on its own resources,
uncontingent upon the actions of agents not in the coalition. Condition
(i) reflects this idea exactly. It requires a coalition to be self
sufficient on its own, both in terms of physical feasibility of allocations
and informational feasibility.
It is also in keeping with the individual informational
constraints on trading, namely that agents can undertake only those
trades which they can verify. Condition (i) extends this requirement
to coalitions. For these reasons, we retain (i) as opposed to (i)' in our
definition of a coalition.
Definition 8 :- An allocation-information list (y , I ) is blocked if there
exists a coalition C with (o ,J ) satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) of
Definition 1 with a (>) y for all i in C, with strict preference holding
for at least one i in C.
Note that we are employing a 'weak' notion of blocking; this is not
important.
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Definition 9 An allocation (x ) together with information (K ),
i = 1,...,m is said lie in the core if
(i) K':VI , K' c', all i
i 0(ii) Ex (s) Xe (s), all s, and
i i(iii) (x ,K ), i = 1,...,m is not blocked.
The notion of optimality embodied in the core is different from that in
Hart [1975] in that we allow information to change endogenously, while
he defines optimality for fixed information.
Definition 10 : The coarse core consists of all allocations (y ) which are
not blocked by any coalition C, subject to the restriction that J = 1 ,
all i in C, and such that y (s) s Xe (s
Definition 11 The fine core consists of all allocations (y ) which lie in
the coarse core, and are not blocked by any coalition C, with
informations J = VI.
The definitions of the coarse core and the fine core are adapted from
Wilson [1976]. (Wilson examines the case in which trading takes place
after a state of nature occurs).
Definition 12 A trading process is said to be fully revealing if
Ii =VI' , all i, where I' is the information of agent i at the end of the
trading process. If a trading process is not fully revealing, it is said
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to be non-revealing. Information I is said to be perfect' if every event
in I contains only one element, i.e. l=[{s 1,...,{sn
Lemma 6 : If an allocation lies in the core, then it lies in both the fine
core and the coarse core.
Wilson [1976] examines the core of a similar economy, in which
trading is carried out ex-post. The problem that arises with his model
also applies to the ex-ante case, so we examine it next. He considers
two polar cases, the coarse core, with no communication, and the fine
core, with full communication. He provides an example in which the
fine core is empty. This, however, is not a problem in our model, and
accordingly, we analyse his example to point out the differences.
Example 3 :
Initial endowments and information are
state
a b c
agent 1 5 1 3
1 Note the distinction between full information and perfect information.
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2 3 5 1
3 1 3 5
I =[{a},{b,c)]
2 (a, c}, (b]
I3 {c},{a, b}]
p1 (s)=1/3, all i,s, and each agent has the same strictly concave,
monotonic utility function in each state.
Note that in this example, initial information is not compatible with
initial endowments. Thus, if agent 1 receives 3 units of the good, he
will not know whether b or c has occurred. However, Wilson does
impose measurability of the consumption bundle with respect to final
information.
The example then proceeds as follows. Any two-agent coalition can
achieve full information, and it is easy to see that with full information,
the only possible allocation in the fine core is the initial endowment.
Without any communication, i.e. when all agents retain their initial
information after trading, the following allocation with no transfer of
information dominates the initial endowment for sufficiently small E
state
a b c
agent 1 5+2c 2-c 2-c
2 2-s 5+2e 2-c
3 2-c 2-c 5+2E
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Thus, there is no unblocked allocation with full information, i.e. the
fine core is empty.
If we impose the requirement that initial information be
compatible with initial endowments, the problem disappears. This is
because the only states agents 2 and 3 will be unable, to distinguish will
have the same endowment, and, given measurability of the final
allocation, the same utility. For example, if we modify endowments to
state
a b c
agent 1 5 1 1
2 3 5 3
3 1 1 5
then the initial endowment does lie in the fine core.
Theorem 5 The core is non-empty
Proof Let I be the coarsest partition that refines all the i. I then
is the best information attainable, given initial informations. (I is
called the meet of the I ). Suppose I contains k (disjoint) events,
indexed by j, j=l,. .. ,k.
Note that for (sg , s) c A E 1, e e (s2) for all i.
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Next, we construct a perfect information economy with k L goods,
giving everyone initial information I. Endowments in the constructed
economy are :
e' (s) = e' (s), s E A.. If agents are expected utility maximizers, then
preferences are
V = p (s))U (x.).
with the obvious extension to the case of state-dependent preferences.
The k-good economy is a standard exchange economy with perfect
information, and by standard theorems, the core of this economy is
non-empty.
The proof of the theorem is completed by noting that any allocation that
is feasible in the original economy and is compatible with the information
available in the original economy is also feasible in the constructed
perfect information economy, and conversely. Thus, any allocation
lying in the core of the constructed economy is also unblocked in the
original economy, since otherwise, the blocking coalition could block
that allocation in the constructed economy. Thus, the core of this
economy is non-empty.
Corollary 1 The coarse core is non-empty; the fine core is
non-empty.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists essentially of demonstrating
the existence of an unblocked allocation when everyone has full
information. Next, we demonstrate that the core of this economy is
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generally different from that of the same economy with perfect
information, and also that core allocations need not be fully revealing,
in the sense that it is possible to achieve unblocked allocations without
everyone having full information. We shall call perfect information
equilibria Arrow-Debreu allocations.
Example 4 : (Arrow-Debreu allocations need not lie in the core)
Consider an economy with two agents, one commodity and two states,
where initial information and endowments are given in the following
table.
state
a b
agent 1 4 4
2 1 1
I I=[{a,b)]
12 =[{a,b}]
Suppose p =(1/3,2/3), and p =(2/3,1/3). Then, the initial endowment
lies in the core, but is not an Arrow-Debreu allocation for any strictly
concave utility function. For example, ( 4 -E ,4+ ), (+E 1-E )
dominates the initial endowment, but cannot be achieved since it requires
more information than is available within the economy. Thus, core
allocations need not be Arrow-Debreu allocations. On the other hand,
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an Arrow-Debreu allocation will always have different consumption in
the two states, and given the availability of information, will always be
informationally infeasible, so that Arrow-Debreu allocations need not lie
in the core. Note that this example does not satisfy the assumption that
aggregate initial information be perfect.
Next, we observe that core allocations need not be fully revealing.
Example 5 : (A non-revealing core allocation)
Consider the one-commodity, three state and three agent economy with
initial data
state
a b c
1 5 3 3
agent 2 3 5 3
3 4 4 6
1I=[{a},{b,c)]
12=[{a, c}, {b}]
13 =[{a,b},{c)]
U (x)=log(x), all i. p (s)=1/3, all i,s.
Consider the allocation
01=(11/3,11/3,11/3)
02=(11/3,11/3,11/3)
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3 =(14/3,14/3,14/3)
yielding
V1=log (11/3); V 2 =ogV(11/3); V3log(14/3).
Then, (ai) is compatible with the null information set, and is a core
allocation. This is checked by first observing that no single agent
coalition can block . Next, if we hold V3 at log(14/3) and maximise
the sum V+V2, we find that log(11/3)+log(11/3) cannot be dominated.
Thus, the grand coalition cannot block o. Similarly, no two-agent
coalition can either, and this allocation thus lies in the core. We do not
present the computations, since they are straightforward. o is then a
non-revealing allocation in the core.
Next, we compare the core with differential information to that
of the associated perfect information economy. We shall provide a
complete characterization of core allocations. In view of Example 4,
such a comparison will be carried out for the case in which aggregate
initial information is perfect.
Let
CD = (xeRLkm:,there exist J , i=1,...,m such that (x ,Ji ) lie in the
core }
The superscript D stands for "differential information".
Definition 13 The core of the associated perfect information economy
is defined by:
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P Lkm. iiC= {xERm: Ex <Ee , i=1,.. .,m, and there is no subset of agents,
i i i l EC, and an allocation o, with Zo (s)sZe (s),ieC, with a ().X , all IEC
with strict preference holding for at least one ieC. }
C is seen to be the usual definition of the core.
Lemma 7 If aggregate initial information is perfect, C cCD
Proof: Follows from the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 : If initial information is perfect, then C P=CD.
D PProof: Let XEC , and suppose x is not in C . Then, there exists a
coalition C and an allocation a which blocks x. Initial information is
perfect, so a is informationally feasible for all agents. Then, C with
(a ,Ii) blocks x, i.e. x is not in C , a contradiction.
Together with Lemma 7, this completes the proof.
This Theorem provides the second rationale for our modelling strategy,
as discussed at the beginning of this Chapter.
Definition 14 : An allocation x is said to be Pareto Optimal (PO) if:
(i) I x (s) < e i(S)
(ii) there is no allocation y, satisfying (i), with y ().x ', all i and
i i
y (>) x , some i
(iii) x ( )e , all i.
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Note that we are defining PO allocations without
information. This is in contrast to Radner [1968].
requiring them to be individually rational.
reference to
We are also
The following is well known.
Lemma 8 : If xeC , then x is PO.
With differential information, we have:
Lemma 9 : If aggregate initial information is perfect, the xECD implies
that x is PO.
Proof: If not, then the coalition consisting of all agents in the economy
can block x. This grand coalition has perfect information.
Lemmas 8 and 9 lead to:
Theorem 7: If aggregate initial information is perfect, C and CD can
differ only over the set of PO allocations.
At this point, it makes a difference whether condition (i) or (i)' is
imposed in the definition of a coalition. With (i)', coalitions are allowed
to block on the basis of economy wide information. If aggregate initial
information is perfect, (i)' leads to the conclusion that C P=C. With
(i), however, we have:
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Theorem 8 : C , even if aggregate initial information is perfect.
The proof is by construction of an example which is given below
(Example 6), after the following discussion.
We already know (Example 4) that if aggregate initial
information is not perfect, then C iC If VI is perfect, then we
know that C and C can only differ over the set of PO allocations. To
prove Theorem 8, therefore, we have to construct an example of a PO
all6cation that does not lie in C , but does so in CD This is alwaays
possible, since C P does not necessarily coincide with the set of PO
allocations. The following example is based on this fact.
Example 6
Initial endowments and informations are:
state
a b
1 2 2
agent 2 1 1
3 1 1.1
I =[{a,b}]
12=[{a,b)]
13=[{a),{b}]
p 1 (a)=2/3, p2 (a)=l/3, p 3(a)=1/2.
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U (x) = log(x), i=1,2,3.
The data in the example have been chosen to satisfy the requirement
that with perfect information, agents 1 and 2 have greater trading
opportunities than either (1,3) or (2,3), and that without perfect
information, agents 1 and 2 have no trading opportunity.
It can be verified that, within rounding error, the allocation o, with
o1 = (2.51,1.28)
2 = (0.64,1.31)
3 = (0.85,1.5)
is PO, but is blocked by a coalition of agents 1 and 2, and the allocation
x = (2.38,1.28)
x2 = (0.62,1.52).
However, a is not blocked by either (1,3) or by (2,3).
With differential information, the trading opportunities of (1,3) and
(2,3) remain the same as if they had perfect information, so it follows
from above that (1,3) and (2,3) cannot block a. Further, the grand
coalition cannot block a, as a is PO. It can be calculated that (1,2) get
greater utility with a than under autarky. Thus, EC D , but a is not in
C. Note that aggregate initial information in this example is perfect.
In the case of perfect aggregate initial information, we then
have a complete characterization of allocations in C They are
allocations in C together with those PO allocations which are blocked
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by perfect information coalitions and these coalitions require more
information than they possess to block these allocations in the case with
differential information.
This leads to the following remark. We observe that in the Example,
agent 3 is, in general, better off than in the associated perfect
information game, since it is not possible for agents 1 and 2 to collude
against him. As a result, one would expect the outcome of such a game
to be biased towards agent 3, due to his informational edge. He is in
the position that without him, agents I and 2 cannot trade at all, and
they can always gain from trade if he is included. This suggests a line
of research which we shall not endeavor to pursue here. In
Chapter VII, we will show that this type of informational advantage
does not disappear even if there are a large number of agents.
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V. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIA AND THE CORE
In this Chapter, we compare the notions of equilibrium
developed in Chapters Il-IV. We are interested in analyzing if core
equivalence holds for our economy. We shall re-impose the assumption
that aggregate initial information is perfect.
From the proof of Theorem 5 (Chapter IV), it is clear that any
fully revealing REE must lie in the core. The reasoning behind this is
that a fully revealing REE is just the standard competitive equilibrium
for the constructed perfect information economy, which, by standard
theorems, lies in the core of the constructed perfect information
economy. The proof shows that any such allocation lies in the core of
the original economy, and a fully revealing REE must therefore lie in
the core.
Theorem 9 A fully revealing REE lies in the core.
Proof We prove this result for the case of expected utility
maximization. The proof for the more general case of state dependent
utility follows directly.
Let I =VI , and let {(p(s),(x (s)),l} be a fully revealing REE.
Suppose the theorem is false, i.e. there exists a viable coalition C
which blocks (x (s)). Then, for at least one i in C,
V (0 ) > V (x ), where o is the allocation to agent i given by
the coalition. This implies that a is not feasible for agent i at prices
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p(s) and information I, since otherwise he would have chosen a instead
of x'. Since I=VI 0, a cannot be informationally infeasible, and so it
must be the case that
p.a > p.e for at least one i, and
p.o > p.e for all i in C.
However, E a ZE e , which implies that
p. a 1 5 p.E e , which leads to the usual contradiction.
This leads us to ask whether non-revealing REE's can lie in the
core, and the answer to this is yes, as the following example shows.
Example 7 : (A non-revealing equilibrium in the core)
We continue with example 5 of Chapter IV.
state
a b c
1 5 3 3
agent 2 3 5 3
3 4 4 6
I I=[{a},{b,c}]
12 [{a,c}, {b)]
13 ={a,b},{c}]
p (s)=1/3, all i,s. U (x)=log(x), all i.
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From example 1, we know that pp 2 p 3 =1 is a non-revealing REE for
this economy. At these prices, equilibrium allocations are
xl=(11/3,11/3,11/3)
x2=(11/3,11/3,11/3)
x3=(14/3,14/3,14/3)
From example 5, we know that this allocation lies in the core. This is
then a non-revealing REE in the core.
In general, however, an REE need not lie in the core, and core
allocations cannot always be decentralised as REE's. The first assertion
is easy to illustrate diagrammatically, and is shown in Figure 6.
Example 8 :(Efficient and inefficient REE's)
The Edgeworth-Bowley box in the Figure shows an economy with two
agents, two states and one commodity. Agent 1 has the null information
set, while agent 2 has perfect information. The initial endowment
point, E, is an REE for this economy. No information is revealed to
agent 1, and the informational constraint thus forces him to trade along
his 45 line. E is the utility maximising point for agent 2 at prices
pI = p2' as depicted. However, any point in the shaded lens-shaped
area dominates E, and E is thus an inefficient REE for this economy.
It is easy to assign numerical values to realise the situation
depicted in the Figure. Note that there also exists an efficient, fully
revealing equilibrium for this economy. This points out that there may
exist multiple REE's, which can be Pareto-ranked. Note that if all
agents have the same initial information, then an REE always lies in the
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core. This is in contrast to the example of Hart [1975], where the
sub-optimality arises due to sequence constraints. There are no
sequence constraints in our model.
This example also shows that this type of inefficiency is
invariant to a re-distribution of income via lump-sum transfers. In the
Figure, all such transfers lie along the 45 degree line of agent 1. For
any such transfer of income, there exists an inefficient REE. Of -
course, one can always perturb endowments so as to make this a perfect
information economy, and if all perturbations are allowed, then an REE
will be generically efficient (since the subset of the space of
endowments which does not give perfect information is of lower
dimensionality than the entire space of endowments, and hence of
(Lebesgue) measure zero).
On the other hand, the following theorem can be proved:
Theorem 10 : Suppose (( ),O)EPmxY has an inefficient REE. Then,
there exist (W) ( ), and k -0 such that (( )n'kn) has an REE that
lies in the core, all n.
Proof: From Theorem 9, we know that the full information price vector
for ((2),0) must be non-revealing. From Theorem 3 and Lemma 1,
there exist (2)n and kn with k n-+O, (W) -( ), such that each (() nk n
has a fully revealing REE.
Corollary: For an open and dense subset of Pm xY, there exists an
efficient REE.
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In the previous Chapter, we examined the relationship between
C and CD core allocations with perfect and differential information.
We have seen that fully revealing REE's lie in C (Theorem 9), and
DExample 8 depicts an REE which does not lie in C . The next example
is perhaps somewhat more interesting. It constructs an REE that is
Pareto Optimal, non-revealing and not in C
Example 10 : (Pareto Optimal REE's need not lie in the core).
We examine a three-consumer economy. There are two states of the
world, a and b, and one good in each state of the world. Initial data
are
state
a b
1 1 2
agent 2 2 1
3 5 5
1 =[{a),{b)]
12=[{a},{b}]
1 3[{a,b}]
p (a)=2/3, p (a)=1/3, p (a)=2/5.
U (x) = log(x), i=1,2,3.
Then, it can be verified that the allocation x, with
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x =(2, 1)
x2x2 =(1,2)
x =(5,5)
is Pareto Optimal. It is the result of maximizing
XIV I + X2 V2 1(- I 2 ' 3
obtained with weights X1 =X2= 16215.
The allocation x does not lie in the core. A coalition of agents 1 and 3
blocks it with perfect final information and consumption
ol=(2.069,1.045)
02=(3.93, 5. 955)
Next, consider the non-cooperative case. It is easily verified that
p(a)=p(b)=1 is a non-revealing price which, together with final
informations equal to Ii and allocations equal to x, forms an REE.
0
The conclusion, so far, is that most economies have an efficient REE.
However, there exist REE's which are Pareto Optimal that do not lie in
the core, as well as REE's that do not lie in the core and are not Pareto
Optimal.
It has not proved possible to answer the following question: is
it true that for most economies, all REE's will lie in the core ? This is
because the properties of the equilibrium correspondences we have to
work with are not strong enough to generate this type of result, as we
now elucidate.
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We know (Lemma 4, Theorems 2 and 3) that "most" prices are
fully revealing, that any strictly positive price vector can be obtained
as the result of utility maximization, and that this inverse relation (the
mapping 1p) is continuous. To establish that all price equilibria are
fully revealing, a stronger result is needed, namely, that every closed
subset of A" can be an equilibrium price set for some economy. In
terms of notation, we have that *:Ao*PmxY is non-empty valued. But
this only establishes that any single price vector can be obtained as the
full information equilibrium via utility maximization. If there are
multiple equilibria, we need to say something about sets of equilibrium
prices. Letting 2 be the set of all closed subsets of A", we could
denote by 0:2 -+Pm xY the map that associates to each subset, A, of A"
the set of preferences/incomes that lead to A as being the set of
equilibrium prices. Then, ( ),ke6(A) if and only if pEA implies that
pE#( (), k), i.e. every element of A is a full information equilibrium for
(2),k. We only know that this is true at every point p. The result
would require that 0 be non-empty valued, and that 0 be a continuous
correspondence. It is not clear whether this requirement is satisfied,
or even true.
Next, we take up the question of whether core allocations can
be decentralized as REE's. By "decentralizing an REE" we mean: does
there exist a set of lump-sum transfers and a price vector such that the
allocation in the core is attained as an REE ?
To construct an example of a core allocation which cannot be
decentralised as an REE, we simply have to observe that the core is
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always non-empty while an REE need not exist. Thus, if we have an
example of an economy in which there is no REE, we immediately have
core allocations which cannot be decentralised.
Example 9 : (A core allocation which cannot be decentralised)
We take the initial data from example 2 of Chapter 111.
state
a b
agent 1 2 2
2 1 3
I =[{a,b)]
12=[{a}, {b}]
1 2 =U[(a)o(),
p =(a,1-a); p =(,1-); U (x)=log(x), all i.
Then, the allocation
(4a,4(1-a))
(48,4(1- ))
lies in the core (this is the allocation that emerges from a perfect
information equilibrium). Note that this allocation is compatible with
information available within the economy. From example 2, we know
that there is no REE for this economy. Further, for a choice of a#1/ 2 ,
agent 1 gets a different allocation in the two states, and the above
allocation cannot be supported as a non-revealing equilibrium (which
would imply that agent 1 consumes the same amount in each state).
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Suppose, therefore, that there exists a set of lump sum
transfers, L and L2' with L 0+L,20 and an e$0 such that p =1+E is an
equilibrium which supports the above allocation. From the market
clearing conditions, one can easily check that the only solution, given
a+6=3/4 is E=0, L1=0, L2=0.
Hsieh and Srivastava [1981] provide an example of an optimal allocation
which cannot be decentralised even when there exist REE's. Figure 7
contains an example with non strictly-convex preferences.
However, core allocations can almost always be decentralized as
REE's, in the sense of the the following Theorem.
DTheorem 11 : Let xEC , and suppose x cannot be decentralized as an
REE. Then, there exists a sequence of economies, (() nk n) such that
k -0, ( ) -*(2) and such that x can be decentralized as an REE for all
n.
Proof: Lemma 9 ensures that x is PO. A standard theorem then
establishes that there exists a full information price vector, p, and a
set of lump sum transfers, Li, such that x is a full information
competitive equilibrium. x cannot be decentralized, which implies that
p must be non-revealing. Appealing to Theorem 3, we have that there
exist ( ) n '( ), income perturbations k n'+ 0 ' and fully revealing prices
pn p such that p n is a full information equilibrium for the economy
(() n k n+L).
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To conclude, we have seen that most econimies have an REE
that lies in the core. If an economy has only an inefficient REE, then
there is another economy, arbitrarily close by, which has an efficient
REE. It is not clear whether most economies have only efficient REE's.
We also know that if a core allocation cannot be decentralized as an
REE, then there is an economy arbitrarily close by for which the same
allocation lies in the core and can be decentralized.
This brings us to the question posed in the introduction. Is an
REE a natural notion of equilibrium in the sense that it inherits the
properties of a competitive equilibrium in the case of perfect
information ? As far as existence and optimality properties are
concerned, we believe the answer is yes, albeit in a generic sense.
- 72 -
VI. TRADING AFTER THE OCCURRENCE OF THE STATE
In this Chapter, we examine cooperative and non-cooperative
outcomes when trading takes place after a state of nature occurs. As
will be seen, some of the results of the previous sections change
significantly. We shall discuss only the case of expected utility
maximization.
First, we have to modify our notion of information. Previously,
all that was meant by information was the ability to distinguish between
states, while no mention was made of subjective probabilities. In fact,
in our examples, we held such probabilities fixed. Once a state occurs,
it is no longer possible to retain fixed subjective probabilities.
Consider the representative agent, with initial information
I = (E 1 ,...,E k, the E. being mutually exclusive events. Let
1 , ... , Ik be the prior subjective probabilities of these events (i.e.
1= X p(s)), and suppose, without loss of generality, that s c E1
occurs. The agent immediately knows that E2 ,. . . ,Ek have not
occurred. His revised subjective probabilities, therefore, are
' =1, '=O, j=2,. .. ,k. In the sequel, we shall assume that s E E
occurs, i1,. . . ,m. This entails no loss of generality. Further, we
shall change terminology, and refer to the events E as 'information',
without referring explicitly to the partition they belong to. We shall
denote by p (s) the revised subjective probabilities of states in El,
where
p (s)=p (s)/(~E I) if (-E ) # 0 and s E E
IM 0111,1MIFIM
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single relative price, p=1, and this is the only source of information to
a2 besides his endowment.
Suppose next that S occurred. Once again, the same spot
exchange of one umbrella for one bathing suit is possible, and a2 does
not require any extra information to execute this trade. Again, there
is only one relative price, p=1.
So far, we have seen that there need be only one market in this
ex-post example, and the operative spot market, or 'market structure',
is independent of which state of nature occurs2 . This line of reasoning
is very different from that of Radner [1979], who also studied the same
problem. In his work, there are two relative prices to consider, p(R)
and p(S). Then, p(R)$p(S) reveals the state to agent a2, while
p(R)=p(S) is non-revealing. If the analysis is truly ex-post, however,
we have seen that there need be only one observable relative price, and
the agent can therefore never compare p(R) and p(S). The only way in
which p(R) and p(S) become relevant is if we have two markets, which
puts us back in the contingent commodity setting, which is difficult to
interpret in an ex-post model. The operation of only one spot market
allows an optimum to be attained. This can be seen by supposing that
both agents had perfect information to start with (by changing the
endowment of a2 slightly, to say 2 U,3 U). Then, if R occurs, both
2 This type of argument is developed and expanded in Shefrin [1979]
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p '(s)=p (s) if (-E ) = 0 and s c E
p '(s)=0 otherwise.
Next, we discuss what is meant by
case, and examine the consumers problem.
ex-post case reduces essentially to that of
under uncertainty.
We start with an example. Suppose
and a2, and two possible states of nature,
Initial endowments are :
market structure in this
We shall argue that this
a competitive equilibrium
there are two agents, al
rain (R) and shine (S).
state
R S
agent al 1 B 2 B
a2 2 U 2 U
where B = bathing suit, and U = umbrella
Ial=[{R},{S}]
I32 [{ R, S}]
I a2 [{R,sI]
Further, we suppose that R has occurred, that one umbrella provides
adequate protection from the rain, and that one bathing suit is all that
is required per person if sunny. On the basis of initial information, al
knows that it is raining, while a2 does not.
Consider the spot exchange of one umbrella for one bathing
suit. This trade is not contingent on any state of nature; a2 does not
need to know which state has occurred in order to undertake this
exchange, which we assume is desirable for both agents.. There is a
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agents know this, and the perfect information equilibrium is the same as
the spot market equilibrium, one bathing-suit being exchanged for one
umbrella. The same holds if S occurs.
We turn next to the consumer's problem. Consider the
representative agent with initial information E1 , and revised subjective
probabilities p'(s), where Ep'(s)=1, with p'(s)=O for s c -E . The
question at hand is the appropriate objective function of the agent.
The agent knows that s c EI has occurred, and is interested in current
consumption. If we stick to our spot market model, then if his net
trade on the spot market is z c RL, his realised utility is U(e+z), where
e is his endowment in the event E . The 'measurability' of e with
respect to initial information implies that e(s)=e for all s in E . As
such, therefore, which state in E1 actually occurs is irrelevant to him,
and he can simply choose z to maximise U(e+z), which is the utility he is
going to get. This problem is exactly the same as the standard model of
competitive equilibrium with certainty. Not surprisingly, equilibrium
allocations allocations for this economy lie in the core.
So far, we have adopted Shefrin's way of modelling market
structure in the ex-post case'. The above interpretation of consumer
behavior in this case, however, is different from his. Even after the
occurrence of the state, Shefrin requires the agent to maximise
' See Shefrin [1979]
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expected utility, not realised or actual utility. The agent still
maximises Ep(s)U(x(s)). As there is only one spot market, the
competitive allocation turns out to be inefficient, since there is no
possibility of inter-state trading. He concludes that spot trading
eliminates the inefficiency arising from the informational constraint in
the ex-ante case, but that the lack of trading across states still leads to
inefficiency. Strictly speaking, our model is not directly comparable to
that of Shefrin, since it is not clear whether he compares equilibria to
others attainable with the information held by agents within the
economy.
We have argued that ex-post, only the realised or actual utility
of the agent matters. In this case, there is no need to trade across
states ex-post, since the only concern of the agent is the utility he
receives in the event E1 . The conclusion, then, is that if we accept
both spot trading and the maximisation of realised utility, then the
ex-post case reduces to that of a competitive equilibrium under
certainty, and there is no inefficiency associated with equilibrium.
Below, we shall show that if we let agents maximise expected utility,
but impose the constraint that final allocations be measurable with
respect to final information, then the resulting equilibrium is the same
as the spot market equilibrium with agents maximising realised, or
actual, utility. The model of the previous sections can be easily
modified to formalise these concepts. In fact, one can allow for very
general forms of communication even in the non-cooperative case. We
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shall do this in a while, but first, we examine similar issues in relation
to the core.
Definition 15 A viable coalition consists of a set of agents
Cc {1, . . ., m, a set of allocations, (a (s)), and a set of final
informations, (A ), such that
(i) A'cE , all i cC
(ii) o (s )=o (s2) for s , s2 E Ai
(iii) Zi (s) E e (s)
(iv) Xp (s)Ui(x (s)) > Ep (s)U (e (s))
Condition (i) requires that final information be no worse than
initial information, while (ii) is the measurability constraint, as in
Wilson [1976]. We remark that this definition is somewhat contorted,
since the measurability constraint implies that the allocation across
states is the same, and we therefore do not need to consider allocations
in different states. It is retained in the above form for ease of
comparison later on.
Definition 16 An allocation-information list (y', Bi) is said to lie in the
core if
(i) B DnE , BicE , all i
(ii) y'(s 1 )=y'(s 2 ) for si , s2 c BI
(iii) (y , B i) is not blocked by a viable coalition, with the obvious
definition of blocking.
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Definition 17 :
(a) The coarse core consists of allocations not blocked by a viable
coalition with B = E .
(b) The fine core consists of allocations in the coarse core not blocked
by a viable coalition with information B =n Ei, all i E C.
Theorem 12: The fine core is non-empty.
Proof Without loss of generality, suppose s E E occurs, all i.
Then, e'(sI)=e (s2 ) for s1 , s2 E , all i. Then, consider the
economy with no uncertainty, in which the initial endowment of agent i
ii i iis e =e (s), s E 1 , and the utility function of the agent is U (x). The
core of this constructed economy is non-empty by standard theorems,
so let (y') be such a core allocation. Define a (s)=y for s E, and
let E =n E . Then, o'(s), s E E, is unblocked for the economy with
full information, as :
Suppose not. Then, there exists a coalition C and an alternative
allocation-information set, say (x ,A ) such that
V (x ) V (a ), i E C, with
V (x ) > V (a ) for some i e C.
Note that for s s2 E A , x (s)=x (s2 ) by the measurability of the
final allocation. Further, since ZsA i p''(s)=1, V'(X') = U (x ), with
the obvious notation. But this implies that
U (xI) > U (y )
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which means that (x ) dominates (y ) for the constructed economy, a
contradiction.
Thus, retaining the measurability assumption of Wilson, and imposing
our own requirement that agents be smart enough to distinguish
between states on the basis of endowments, we find that there is no
existence problem. Next, we show that if we extend the spot market
interpretation to the core, and let agents worry about realised utility,
then the resulting allocations are the same as if we retain the
measurability assumption. In this sense, this assumption is
non-binding.
Definition 18
(a) A spot coalition consists of a set of agents, Cc{1,. .. ,m), and a set
of allocations (o ), such that
(i) Xo _ E el, where e =e (s), s e E
(ii) U (o ) U (e ), all i E C.
(b) The spot-core (S-core) consists of allocations not blocked by any
spot coalition.
The following is well known
Theorem 13: The S-core is non-empty.
Theorem 14: The viable core and the S-core are equivalent.
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Proof This is seen by inspection. The measurability constraint
immediately implies that any allocation attainable by a spot coalition is
also attainable by a viable coalition, and conversely. The conclusion
follows directly.
Corollary : The viable core is non-empty.
The same equivalence extends to an REE defined with measurability and
a spot market equilibrium.
Definition 19 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) consists of a
L
set Ac S, p(s) & R,, s C A, and a set of allocations
{x i(s)), i=1, ... ,m, s E A, and a set of events A ,...,Am such that
(i) A =n A', A'cE', all i.
(ii) For each i, prob(s r A )=1.
(iii) For s,, s2 E A, p(s 1)=p(s 2 ).
(iv) p(s) = 0 for all s E -A
(v) x i(s) maximises Ep'(s)U (x'(s)) subject to the budget constraint
and the constraint that s., s2 e Ai ==> xi(sx)=x (s2).
(vi) X . x'(s) s E . e (s), s P A.
A is the maximal event in which trading takes place, while Ai is
the minimal event that agent i knows has occurred. (i) requires that
final information, as represented by A be at least as good as initial
information, (ii) is a consistency requirement on subjective
probabilities, while (iii) is the 'measurability' constraint on prices,
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requiring that expectations be fulfilled. For convenience, we set prices
to zero in all states in which no trading occurs. (v) requires each
agent to behave optimally, while (vi) is market clearing. There is no
restriction on the A besides (i). The definition of an REE thus allows
for very general forms of communication between agents.
Definition 20 A spot market equilibrium is a price vector, p c R,,
and a set of allocations, (x ), i=1, . . .,m such that
(i) Z x' s E e', e' = e'(s) for s cE E'
(ii) x maximises U (x ) subject to p.x < p.e
We state :
Theorem 15: There exists an S-equilibrium.
Theorem 16: An S-equilibrium is an REE, and conversely.
Corollary : The exists an REE.
In the ex-post case, therefore, an REE lies in the core, which follows
from the spot-market equilibrium lying in the S-core. It is easy to
apply standard theorems to show that any core allocation can also be
decentralised as an REE for a given set of initial informations.
Finally, we discuss how our analysis is related to the efficient
markets hypothesis. This hypothesis is generally described as
. P" Mv -I' , I . ..
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maintaining that the market price embodies all the information held by
agents within the economy. Our ex-post model is certainly compatible
with this view, and goes a little further. Information in the model
consists of being able to tell which state of nature has occurred. The
market price does depend on this information. The resulting allocation
is efficient in the sense that it lies in the core. The market price does
not reveal the state of nature in general, but this is seen to be
irrelevant, since the spot market allocation coincides with the perfect
information equilibrium.
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VII. LARGE ECONOMIES
In this Chapter, we demonstrate that our results are generally
invariant to the size of the economy. To achieve a contrast, we shall
examine the opposite extreme of the model examined so far, namely one
with a non-atomic measure space of consumers. The model is adapted
from Hildenbrand [1974].
Let A=[O,1], and let v be a non-atomic probability measure on
(A,B(A)), where B(A) is the Borel c-algebra of A. An element CEB(A)
is a coalition, while A is the set of consumers. The initial information
of aEA is given by I , and his final information is denoted by I. The
meet of la, aECEB(A) is written as VI a, aEC. The definitions of final
information, REE, a coalition, the core, etc. carry over from the
previous chapters. The only difference is that a coalition can only
consist of sets in B(A), and that statements that previously held for
i=1,...,m must now hold for all aEA. The translation of definitions is
direct, and so we do not state them explicitly.
The assumption that preferences are convex can be dropped.
Preferences, ( ) a' have to satisfy the technical requirement that for
x,yeX, { a : x() ay} is measurable.
Let $(( ),k) denote the Walrasian, or full information, equilibrium
correspondence. The following is well known
Theorem 17 : $(( ),k);3 C $0
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Again, an REE need not exist. Example 2 of Chapter Ill can be
modified to demonstrate this, as follows:
Example 11 :
Let v be the Lebesgue measure on A. Initial data is:
state
s 
__ s2
agent a 2 2
b 1 3
1 =[(a,b)]
12=[{a},{b}]
p a=(a,1-a) if
Pa ipa (S,1- 6) if
ua(x)=log(x)
ae [0,1/2)
bE [1/2,1]
aE [0, /2),
aE [1/2, 1]
all a.
Agents are thus partitioned into two groups with equal weight. The
first group is identical to consumer 1 in Example 2, the second to
consumer 2. It is straightforward to verify that exactly the same
argument holds here as in Example 2, i.e. there does not exist an REE
for this economy.
REE's do exist generically, and to adapt the proof of
Theorem 3, we need to specify the economy somewhat more precisely.
Formally, an economy is a map :(A,B(A),v)+PxR, where P is the space
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of preferences and R is the space of income perturbations. k(a)
denotes the income perturbation of agent a.
Theorem 18 : Suppose E does not have an REE. Then, there exist
() ,k (a) such that E has an REE for each n, and such that
n n n
(>)"+*(>) , all a, and k (a)+O, all a.a a n
Proof: The construction in the proof of Theorem 3 is done pointwise,
and the proof therefore follows directly from Theorem 3.
Note that we have implicitly required pointwise convergence in
the above theorem. This can be made more appealing by examining
economies as distributions, rather than via the map .. A formal
presentation of this -equivalent representation is contained in
Hildenbrand [1974], and we do not repeat it here.
Example 8 can be extended in the same way as above to show
that an REE need not lie in the core. The existence of core allocations
is also immediate. As in Theorem 5, it is easy to see that the
constructed "perfect information" economy has a non-empty core, and
that allocations that lie in the core of the constructed economy also lie
in the core of the original economy. We state:
Theorem 19: The core is non-empty.
Corollary: The coarse core is non-empty, as is the fine core.
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The relationship between CD and C is exactly the same in the
continuum economy as it is in the finite economy. This may seem
surprising in the light of Example 6, since we would expect the
monopoly power of an agent with better information to lessen with an
increase in the number of agents, at least if aggregate initial
information is perfect. This is not true, the reason being that even
with a continuum of agents, the core need not coincide with the set of
all PO allocations. Thus, it is possible to construct an allocation in CD
which is not in CA. In fact, this result requires only one agent with
superior information, even though the measure v is non-atomic. This
can be seen by partitioning A into three subsets, Al=[0,1/2),
A 2=[1/2,1), A3 =1 with each A. corresponding to agent i in
example 6. Then, in the perfect information economy, it is possible for
coalitions A and A2 to collude against A3 , but not in the economy with
differential information.
It is easy to see that Example 9 can also be extended to hold in
the large economy, i.e. that there exist Pareto Optimal REE's-which do
not lie in the core.
Finally, it is true that "most" core allocations can be
decentralized in the sense of Theorem 11. This follows from
Theorem 18 combined with Theorem 3 of Hildenbrand [1968]. The
reasoning is the same as that in the economy with a finite number of
consumers.
~ww
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VIII. ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS
In this Chapter, we examine the important issue of the
enforceability of contracts. In the ex-ante model of Chapters ll-V, all
contracts were made prior to the occurrence of the state. It was
assumed that such contracts would be binding, i.e. that when a state of
nature actually occurred, agents would not attempt to renege on their
commitments.
In general, it is usually in the interest of some agents to
recontract after a state of nature occurs. The following example
illustrates.
Example 12
Consider an economy with two agents, three states and one commodity.
Initial information and endowments are given below.
state
a b
agent 1 2 2
2 1 3
11 =[{a,b}]
I =[{a),(b} ]
UI (x) =U2(x) = log(x); the subjective probabilities of the agents are
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Then, o with
ol=(4a,4(1-a))
02,4(1I
lies in the core.
Suppose that this contract is agreed upon, and now state b occurs. If
a is such that 4(1-a)<2, i.e. a>1/2, then adhering to the contract gives
agent 1 lower utility than if what he can get by refusing to trade, i.e.
by breaking the contract. Note that if agent 1 refuses to trade, he
does so at the expense of agent 2. Thus, agent 2 has an incentive to
enforce the contract.
The illustration provided by this example is not specific to an
economy with differential information. It applies equally well to an
economy in which all agents have perfect information. In what follows,
we shall examine which of the contracts that arise in our model are
enforceable. We shall only consider the case of expected utility
maximization.
The example motivates a definition of enforceability. We say
that a contract is enforceable if at least one of the parties has an
incentive to sue for breach of contract. One can imagine a legal system
which would arise for the purpose of implementing such litigation. This
definition of enforceability can be rephrased as follows. We can say
that a contract is enforceable if for any re-allocation of resources
ex-post, some agent is made worse off. This says that ex-post, the
contract must be Pareto optimal:
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Definition 21 : A contract x=(x i(s)), i1,...,m, s=s1 ,. .,sk is
enforceable in s if there is no allocation (y i(s)), i1,...,m such that
(i) iy (s)5Ee (S)
(ii) U (y'(s)) U I(x I(s)), all i, and
Ui(yi (s))>U (x (s)), some i.
If x is enforceable in all seS, then x is called enforceable.
The definition states that once the state has occurred, then the
agreements in x which are contingent on s be ex-post Pareto optimal.
If they are not, then there is no incentive for any agent to stick to the
terms of -the contract, since renegotiation can make everyone better off.
Thus, any attempt to renege on an enforceable contract will be opposed
by at least one agent, and for this reason, we call such contracts
enforceable.
Theorem 20 Core allocations are enforceable.
Proof: Let (x, I) be a core allocation, and say sIeS occurs. Without
loss of generality, suppose x is not enforceable in s . Then, there
exists an allocation y, with
Ui(y'(s))U (x(s I)), all i, and with strict inequality holding for some
i.
Consider first the case in which aggregate initial information is perfect.
In this case, consider the allocation
o (s ) y (s 1 )
.................
............
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o (s)=x '(s) for all ses .
Since aggregate initial information is perfect, (a, I ) is physically and0
informationally feasible for the grand coalition. Also,
V (a ) = Xp (s)U (a (s))
p (S )U,(y,(s ))+Ep (s)U (x (s)),
(the summation being over ss )
>V (x ), all i, and
>V (x ), some i.
This implies that (x,l) is blocked by the grand coalition with the
allocation information pair (a,VI 0 ).
If aggregate initial information is not perfect, then let A be the event in
Vi such that s EA. Then, let a (s)=y (s1 ) if seA, and a (s)=x (s)
otherwise. The same proof follows.
Corollary 1: Any Pareto Optimal allocation is enforceable.
This implies that there are enforceable contracts that do not lie in the
core. Example 6 provides one such example.
Corollary 2: Fully revealing REE's are enforceable.
Together with Example 10, we get the following somewhat surprising
result.
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Theorem 21 There exist enforceable, non-revealing REE's which do
not lie in the core.
We conclude that enforceability is straightforward as far as core
allocations are concerned. This is not true with REE's. Example 8
contains an example of an REE that does not lie in the core. It is clear
that this REE is not enforceable, since there exists an ex-post allocation
which makes both agents better off. In fact, the allocation in
Example 8 is not even Pareto Optimal. On the other hand, fully
revealing REE's are enforceable. So are Pareto Optimal REE's, even
though they may be non-revealing and not lie in the core.
The main conclusion of this section is that REE's as in
Example 8 will not be enforceable. All parties to the contract may be
better off from renegotiation of the contract. This provides some
motivation for the existence of both spot and futures markets. Spot
trading becomes useful, unlike the Arrow-Debreu paradigm, when, due
to the presence of differential information, there are gains to be had
from ex-post trading which simply do not exist in the futures market.
In particular, no non-Pareto optimal contract will be enforceable, and in
such cases, one would almost certainly observe spot trades taking place
after the state of nature gets revealed. It is often argued that the
Arrow-Debreu representation of an economy is misleading in the sense
that it cannot explain the simultaneous existence of both spot and
futures markets. We have seen that even in the absence of an explicitly
dynamic model, differential information can provide a role for such a
dual existence.
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Figure 1
The topology of closed convergence
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Figure 2
The budget correspondence
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Figure 3
The non-existence of an REE
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Figure 4
The price space
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Figure 5
Generic Existence
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Figure 6
Inefficient Rational Expectations Equilibria
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Figure 7
Inefficient Rational Expectations Equilibria
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